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Abstract: Myanmar has crafted a neutral foreign policy since its colonial years to avoid leaning too much on any 
foreign power, but a spiraling political crisis at home is pushing it toward China as a buffer against international 
outrage. Myanmar faces charges of genocide against the Rohingya. China has backed Myanmar in the UN. In 
fact, China is in a similar situation. China is grappling with international criticism over perceived repression of 
ethnic Uighur people. Myanmar is exposed to various words and loud in the international community. So 
Myanmar wants to improve relations with China and is turning into an active cooperative attitude as a strategy to 
secure a friendly army. This paper shows how the diplomatic relations between Myanmar and China are 
changing, and how Myanmar’s foreign strategy toward China is approaching. Also this article analyzes the 
outlook of diplomatic relations and the implications of the current situation. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
China‘s influence in Myanmar manifests on three different levels. At the bilateral level, 
the government and the military establishment of Myanmar receives diplomatic dividends for 
maintaining good ties with China. At the domestic political level, China‘s relations with the 
country‘s ethnic organizations make it an important stakeholder in the ongoing reconciliation 
process. Finally, at the economic level, a lack of alternatives makes Naypyidaw reliant on 
Chinese investments, thereby ensuring favorable policies towards China over the longer term, 
notwithstanding regime changes (Monish Tourangbam and Pawan Amin 2019). Myanmar‘s 
ruling military junta decided to open up to the West in 2011 in order to reduce its 
dependence on China, but the Rohingya crisis has pushed Myanmar back toward China. Suu 
Kyi has been heavily criticized for her silence, but China has shielded her regime in the UN by 
whittling down a Security Council statement drafted by the UK. Beijing also attempted to stop 
a Security Council briefing on the Rohingya issue and reduce the budget allocated for 
investigating the incidents in Rakhine state. Moreover, China has positioned itself as a 
mediator between Myanmar and Bangladesh, which agreed to the three-step solution to the 
Rakhine state problems as proposed by China: stop violence, start repatriation and promote 
development. Myanmar has crafted a neutral foreign policy since its colonial years to avoid 
leaning too much on any foreign power, but a spiraling political crisis at home is pushing it 
toward China as a buffer against international outrage because of Rohingya issue. Myanmar 
is the poor but quickly developing and it is trying to wipe out Muslim Rohingya people near 
its border with Bangladesh.  
Myanmar faces charges of genocide against the mainly Muslim Rohingya minority 
group. In the same situation, China had backed Myanmar in the U.N. Security Council when a 
military junta ruled the country before 2011. Because China is grappling with international 
criticism over perceived repression of ethnic Uighur people who oppose living under Beijing‘s 
rule (Ralph Jennings 2019). Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi made a two-day visit to 
Myanmar at the invitation of State Counselor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi in 2019. The visit was 
made just before the State Counselor‘s departure next week to contest the genocide case 
against Myanmar at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the Netherlands. Myanmar 
authorities want to meet with the Chinese counterparts, because Myanmar is being isolated 
and alienated from the international community on the Rohingya issue. This Rohingya issue is 
now the single cause of Myanmar‘s lack of international credibility. In this state of Myanmar, 
questions arose about the change in Myanmar‘s diplomatic strategy toward China. How did 
diplomatic relations between China and Myanmar change before and after the Rohingya 
issue? How is the Myanmar government's diplomatic strategy approaching toward China in 
particular? As well, how can we anticipate bilateral relations in the future, and what 
implications does the change in diplomatic relations between the two countries have in the 
Indo-Pacific region?  
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With these research questions in mind, data for this paper was compiled from an 
exhaustive review of books, articles, and journalistic accounts of Rohingya affairs, in general, 
and Myanmar‘s foreign strategic change toward China, more specifically. Additionally, 
numerous Chinese-language source materials, including books, newspaper article, and 
government document were examined. In the end, I also found the status and honor 
literature in international relations to be a useful theoretical backdrop for this study. 
Based upon this careful review, it appears that while China is looking to expand 
investment in Myanmar, the Myanmar government is seeking a new diplomatic strategy 
approach to breaking up the isolation from the international community as a result of recent 
Rohingya crisis. In this regard, this paper explores the changes of Myanmar's foreign strategy 
approach to China. This article proceeds in four steps. First it deals with the examination of 
the political changes in Myanmar and Myanmar-China economic relations. This is followed by 
an account and analysis of Rohingya crisis. The third section focuses on presenting the status 
of foreign strategy approach between Myanmar and China. The analysis of the future 
prospects for Myanmar-China relations and some implications for the Indo-Pacific region is 
made in the final section. 
 
HISTORICAL AND GEOGRAPHICAL RELATIONS 
 
Myanmar and China are inextricably linked by geography, history, ethnicity, culture, 
and economy. The original Myanmar tribe came down from Tibet and spawned the kings 
who united the kingdom of Bama or Myanmar in the XII century and became the dominant 
ethnic group of modern Burma, now formally known as Myanmar. The two countries share a 
land border of more than 1,300 miles, populated largely by tribes living on both sides of the 
border in Burma‘s eastern Shan and Kachin states and in China‘s southwestern Yunnan 
Province. Myanmar has a long and colorful historical relationship with China. Traditionally, the 
northern reaches of the country were subjected to large-scale migrations of Sino-Thai 
peoples who inhabited the northern Shan and Kachin states. Chinese emperors have also 
historically threatened Burmese kingdoms and sought to subjugate them within a web of 
neighboring vassal states in securing political compliance and tribute. Consequently, some 
measure of Myanmar‘s threat perceptions has traditionally originated from China.  
These perceptions were held at bay when the country was colonized by the British, 
beginning in 1826 when they captured Arakan and Tenasselim after the conclusion of the 
First Anglo-Burmese War. The strong control exerted by the British over the country from the 
late nineteenth century and the colonizer‘s equally strong control in parts of China deflected 
this threat (Narayanan Ganesan 2018). Accordingly, Myanmar and China have generally 
enjoyed a cordial relationship since the modern boundaries were drawn during the British 
colonial era. Perhaps the major exception is when the PLA (People's Liberation Army) joined 
and supported the communist riots in Myanmar during the Chinese Cultural Revolution. 
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However, despite attacking the army against a communist riot in the northeast of the 
country, General Ne Win, then head of the Burmese military government, was careful to 
maintain the right relationship with China. He also worked closely with Soviet Union, China's 
enemy then and received military and other forms of support from the United States. 
Nevertheless, the period of confrontation with the PLA left a significant mark on the military 
successors of Newin, who had acquired all the scars of the battle to fight Chinese invaders. 
After Deng Xiao Ping came to power, Chinese support for the communist insurgency 
in Burma was withdrawn and Beijing encouraged the Kokang, Kachin, Wa, and Mong La 
insurgent border groups to negotiate cease-fire agreements with the Burmese military 
government. As part of the ceasefire arrangements with the military regime, these tribes were 
assigned relative autonomy over areas of the Shan and Kachin states, which later became 
enshrined in the 2008 constitution (Clapp 2015). 
 
THE MYANMAR‘S POLITICAL CHANGE AND RELATIONS WITH CHINA 
 
Myanmar, under the 2008 Constitution, strives for both internal legitimacy, and 
legitimacy in the eyes of the international community. At one time, tensions in relations with 
China have come to fore due to Myanmar‘s economic reform program and its expansion of 
external relations. But the new government in Myanmar took office in March 2011 and China 
sent its political adviser to Myanmar in April 2011.Jia Qinglin was the first foreign leader to visit 
Myanmar, soon after the new government came to power.  
During his visit, China promised assistance irrespective of the development path 
chosen by Myanmar in accordance with its national conditions. However, China expressed 
concerns over safeguarding border areas stability and highlighted the importance of 
sustaining a stable environment. President Thein Sein assured that Myanmar‘s policy toward 
China would remain unchanged. During Thein Sein‘s visit to China in May 2011, the 
relationship was upgraded to comprehensive strategic cooperative partnership. It was 
declared to be the closest and most important diplomatic relationship (Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, the PRC 2011). At the 66th session of the General Assembly in September 2011, China 
extended support to Myanmar‘s ongoing political reconciliation and opposed interference in 
its internal affairs. Against this backdrop, the Chinese side called for maintaining high-level 
contacts, ensuring the completion of major projects and enhancing coordination in 
international and regional affairs to strengthen the bilateral strategic partnership. In response, 
Myanmar expressed its desire to step-up communication and exchanges with neighboring 
countries as well as international community. Soon after the relationship was upgraded, 
Beijing‘s concerns became a reality with the sudden suspension of the US $3.6 billion-worth 
Myitsone Dam project on September 2011. It shook the foundation of the relationship built 
during the military junta period in Myanmar. To improve the relationship, Myanmar‘s Foreign 
Minister has visited China as special envoy of the President over the dam suspension.  
Journal of Liberty and International Affairs | Vol. 6, No. 1, 2020 | eISSN 1857-9760 
Published online by the Institute for Research and European Studies at www.e-jlia.com      
     
 
 
 
 
 14 
There were external forces and also internal political dynamics influencing the foreign 
policy priorities of Myanmar. However, Myanmar still may have to pay $800 million with 
interest to the state-owned China Power Investment Corporation, the amount it claims to 
have already spent on the dam. The NLD government is now grappling with whether to 
forfeit that amount or yield to new Chinese pressure to restart the project (Lintner 2019). 
During State Councilor Dai Bingguoís visit to Myanmar in 2014 to attend the 4th summit of 
the Greater Mekong Sub-regional cooperation (GMS), both Myanmar and China discussed 
bilateral relations, sub-regional cooperation, global and regional issues including border 
stability, implementation of major projects and the economic and trade cooperation by 
exploiting the complementary advantages. And Myanmar Parliamentary Speaker, Shwe Mann 
visited China in 2012. China reiterated respect for Myanmar‘s sovereignty and territorial 
integrity, and encouraged it to settle the problems and maintain stability along the border 
areas. Chinese concern over recent developments was termed as complicated changes in the 
global situation which have brought opportunities and challenges for both countries. Chinese 
side called for enhancing mutual trust, supporting each other‘s core interests, expanding 
cooperation, coordination on regional and international affairs. Meanwhile, President Xi 
Jinping told the Union Solidarity and Development Party delegation that China has always 
handled its relations with Myanmar from a strategic perspective. Aung San Suu Kyi endorsed 
China-Myanmar friendship in her speech at the World Economic Forum on East Asia and 
Beijing took opportunity to enhance understanding with the NLD party. Moreover, Yang 
Jiechi met with Myanmar counterpart on the sidelines of the ASEAN foreign ministers 
meeting and expressed desire to maintain high-level contacts, enhance strategic 
communication and cement the foundation of the bilateral relations. For the relations to 
withstand the test of vicissitudes of international situations, the Chinese side asked for 
maintaining high-level visits and exchange views on major issues of common concern to lay 
down an action plan for enhancing the strategic partnership. After the Myitsone Dam 
controversy, for the first time, Myanmar President visited China to attend the 9th China-
ASEAN Expo in Nanning, capital of south China's Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region. At 
this time, President U Thein Sein called for fostering bilateral ties in a move to win confidence 
of the Chinese investors and restore ties with Beijing. In 2013, U Thein Sein gave an interview 
welcoming Chinese investment, especially those that can create jobs in Myanmar and 
announced that Chinese investments in Myanmar are mutually beneficial for both the 
countries. In the press communiqué issued on April 2013, China reiterated its respect for the 
independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Myanmar and its support for 
government‘s efforts to maintain national unity and ethnic harmony. The two sides also 
vowed to strengthen coordination and cooperation in ASEAN+1, ASEAN+3, the East Asia 
Summit, GMS and the UN and to safeguard common interests of developing countries. China 
realized the need for steering the ties in the right direction on the basis of mutual respect, 
equality and mutual benefit, deepen strategic mutual trust and safeguard shared interests. 
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Beijing is hard-pressed to safeguard its interests from being swayed by the vicissitudes 
in international politics and external forces (Kubo 2016). Myanmar has opened up in all 
directions and the reform policy creates a fair competition where the Chinese companies 
once enjoyed unprecedented advantages due to sanctions and isolation policy (Singh 2014). 
At the Strengthening Connectivity Partnership, Chinese President committed to US $40 billion 
fund for infrastructure development among the Silk Road Economic Belt nations which 
involve revival of the ancient Silk Road between China and Europe via Afghanistan and 
Central Asia, besides linking BCIM Corridor as well as China-Pakistan Economic Corridor 
(Gurudas and Thomas 2018). China envisages an economic corridor linking its south-western 
Yunnan province through Myanmar to Kolkata as a key segment of a land-based ‗Silk Road 
economic belt‘, and is also planning to boost ties with port cities, such as Chennai, through a 
‗Maritime Silk Road‘ starting out from south-eastern Fujian province through South China Sea 
to Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf. Regarding the proposed 21st century Maritime Silk 
Road, Myanmar considered that the route can play an important role in the development of 
the country by bringing new economic opportunities for Myanmar and its people. 
Accordingly, Myanmar is now regarded as a newly emerging destination for businesses on 
account of its strategic geographical location. Located on the southern tip of Indochina 
peninsula, possesses an important strategic location on the blinks of Indian Ocean and Bay of 
Bengal, the significant gateway for China to Indo-Pacific regional order and becoming as a 
commercial corridor for both giant neighbors. It is on the cross road of China‘s Go West 
Policy on the one hand and India‘s Look East Policy on the other. Similarly, Myanmar is 
important for China‘s landlocked southwestern provinces market access to Bangladesh and 
India through transit trade instead of China‘s eastern coast (Chaw Sein, 2015). China-
Myanmar cooperation has a sound foundation.  
Therefore, it may achieve early harvest results in the building of BRI (Chenyang and 
Shaojun 2019). Myanmar‘s government signed two memorandums of understanding (MOUs) 
and an agreement letter with China at a Beijing‘s Belt and Road Forum, detailing 
strengthened cooperation between the countries on the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor 
(CMEC), trade and technology. The estimated 1,700-kilometer-long corridor will connect 
Kunming, the capital of China‘s Yunnan province, to Myanmar‘s major economic 
checkpoints-first to Mandalay in central Myanmar, and then east to Yangon and west to the 
Kyaukphyu Special Economic Zone (SEZ). Unless China‘s diplomacy toward Myanmar 
changed and the Burma Communist Party (BCP) broke up, the power ownership and 
structure might not have been the same as it is at present. Arms transfer and economic ties 
have dramatically increased China‘s influence on and within Myanmar (Marvin 1998). 
Myanmar was always dependent on China for political protection in the UN during the years 
of military government when China and Russia protected them in the Security Council against 
international sanctions, and today they‘re still protecting Myanmar‘s civilian government 
against international sanctions. 
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ROHINGYA ISSUE AND INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE 
 
The Rohingya, who numbered around one million in Myanmar at the start of 2017, are 
one of the many ethnic minorities in the country. Rohingya Muslims represent the largest 
percentage of Muslims in Myanmar, with the majority living in Rakhine state as 
geographically represented in Figure 1. They have their own language and culture and say 
they are descendants of Arab traders and other groups who have been in the region for 
generations. But the government of Myanmar, a predominantly Buddhist country, denies the 
Rohingya citizenship and even excluded them from the 2014 census, refusing to recognize 
them as a people. It sees them as illegal immigrants from Bangladesh. 
Since late August 2017, more than 671,000 Rohingya Muslims have fled the Rakhine 
state to escape the military‘s large-scale campaign of ethnic cleansing. The atrocities 
committed by Myanmar‘s security forces, including mass killings, sexual violence, and 
widespread arson, amount to crimes against humanity. Military and civilian officials have 
repeatedly denied that security forces committed abuses during the operations, claims which 
are contradicted by extensive evidence and witness accounts. 
The Rohingya, a highly persecuted Muslim group numbering over one million, face 
discrimination both from their neighbors and their nation, and are not considered citizens by 
Myanmar‘s government. Buddhist nationalist groups, including the MaBaTha and the anti-
Muslim 969 Movement, regularly call for boycotts of Muslim shops, the expulsion of Muslims 
from Myanmar, and attacks on Muslim communities. After two waves of violence, reprisals, 
and riots in June and October of 2012 intensified the century-old conflict in the 
predominantly Buddhist country, more than one hundred thousand Muslim Rohingyas were 
internally displaced and hundreds killed.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Spread of Rohingya Inside and Outside Myanmar (Source: The Arakan Project/BBC 2017) 
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There is little indication that addressing the Rohingya issue will become a priority any 
time soon for Myanmar‘s government, which has focused instead on establishing a new 
relationship with the military and addressing multiple ongoing insurgencies. The military 
signed a cease-fire with several armed ethnic groups in October 2015, but some major 
groups—including two of the largest militias, the United Wa State Army and the Kachin 
Independence Army—continue to fight the government. While the cease-fire agreement was 
a potential step towards peace in Myanmar, it failed to finalize a framework for a new 
balance of power between the central government and local authorities in the restive 
borderlands or require ethnic groups to disarm. 
Tensions between Buddhist and Muslim communities in Myanmar's Rakhine state 
have escalated dramatically since late August 2017. A series of attacks by a group of 
Rohingya militants calling itself the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) on military and 
police outposts killed more than seventy people, including twelve Burmese security forces 
personnel. In response, the military launched a brutal crackdown on Rohingya villages, 
causing over seven hundred thousand people to flee across the border to Bangladesh since 
August 2017. Widespread reports indicate indiscriminate killings and burning of Rohingya 
villages, escalating to the point that the UN Human Rights Commissioner called the situation 
in Rakhine state ―A textbook example of ethnic cleansing‖ (Guardian, 2017). The violence has 
led to a growing humanitarian crisis in neighboring Bangladesh, where nearly one million 
Rohingya now reside in refugee camps along the border. In this situation, friendly relations 
between the US-Myanmar have gradually changed. Due to disagreements over human rights 
issues, the two countries have remained a divisive factor. However, Myanmar‘s stability is 
increasingly important to U.S. interests given Myanmar‘s strategic importance in Southeast 
Asia, vast natural resources, and emerging democratic government. 
These are now the only real possibilities on offer for the Rohingya, a community that 
is, by and large, on its own, with dwindling numbers of supporters on the international stage, 
and grandiose talk of worldwide relief and international law and justice accompanied by little 
to no action. The 1982 citizenship law excluded the Rohingya from a list of 135 officially 
recognized ethnic groups. The governments officials today refuse even to acknowledge the 
term ‗Rohingya‘ insisting that they are illegal immigrants from neighboring Bangladesh and 
have no history in the country. This denial of citizenship has enabled numerous human rights 
abuses and impedes international efforts to assist the growing number of Rohingya who are 
fleeing to neighboring countries to escape persecution (Raymond, 2015). Wave after wave of 
extreme violence against them culminated in August 2017 with a crackdown that forcibly 
displaced nearly a million people. At least 9,000 members of their community died in just the 
first month of the onslaught, according to Médecins Sans Frontières, an NGO that has 
produced the most authoritative estimate of fatalities to date.  
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FACTORS AFFECTING CHAINA-MYANMAR FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
Britain ruled Myanmar for more than a century. That is why Myanmar has strived for a 
nonaligned foreign policy for decades, probably to avoid a return to colonialism. Basically, 
considering the various circumstances, it is clear that the Myanmar‘s government has no 
confidence in China. Myanmar business people sometimes feel condescension from Chinese 
partners, while Yangon hopes to avoid any sovereign debt. The Chinese-funded $3.6 billion 
Myitsone Dam project (Zhou 2019) and China‘s stake in a seaport have worried the 
government about owing a debt. But Myanmar now wants any foreign investment to benefit 
the country, not just the investor. It vets projects at international standards. 
In 2019, Aung San Suu Kyi and the Chinese foreign minister discussed to promote 
bilateral cooperation under China‘s Belt and Road Initiative. The $1 trillion initiative extends 
Chinese-funded infrastructure around Asia with the aim of building new trade routes. 
Considered from a strategic and security standpoint, Myanmar's appreciation for China's 
importance as a great neighbor with unequal power and influence in Asia and the immediate 
local environment has always been a source of national political concern. Earlier China's entry 
into China and BCP support brought this reality back to modern times. The fact that the 
major ethnic armed groups representing the Wa, Kokang, Kachin and Shan have Chinese 
roots and have strong political and economic ties to China makes the situation even more 
important. As a result, from a political and strategic point of view, Chinese cooperation is 
essential for Myanmar to achieve domestic political cohesion and security. China has 
repeatedly experienced this situation by reminding Myanmar that border security and 
security are closely tied to how Myanmar addresses conflicts near the border. The simple 
reason for this development is the fact that violence in border areas always results in floods 
of refugees across borders in Yunnan, China. This development is not surprising as it is the 
safest exit abroad. 
Ethnic insurgency in Myanmar has always involved neighboring countries and 
traditionally China and Thailand were the most involved in these activities. In the case of 
Thailand, the previous Thai governments‘ policy of supporting the Karen National Union 
(KNU) and the Shan State Army-South (SSA-S) as part of a broader buffer policy against 
Myanmar strained bilateral relations between the two countries (Chachavalpongpun 2005, 
58-9). In the case of China, the situation is much more complicated and spans a broader 
spectrum of groups. The first two of these are the Wa and the Kokang – ethnic Chinese who 
formed the sword arms of the Burmese Communist Party (BCP). The two groups are 
represented by the United Wa State Army (UWSA) and the Myanmar National Democratic 
Alliance Army (MNDAA) respectively. China has always maintained that it neither supports 
nor harbors ethnic insurgents from Myanmar and has in the past even pressured smaller 
groups like the MNDAA to sign ceasefire agreements. It has also sent government officials to 
observe negotiations between the Myanmar government‘s Union Peace Making Work 
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Committee (UPWC) and the KIA (Ganesan 2014, 131-32). Analyzing the factors influencing 
mutual relations between China and Myanmar diplomatic relations can be summarized as 
follows. First, governance traps. Myanmar's industrial processes were heavily influenced by 
policies, and the government's management experience and efficiency were essential for 
industrial development. For a long time, Myanmar's economic lifeblood was in the hands of 
the military that had no economic management training and lacked economic expertise and 
management skills, which had affected the country's economic development to some extent. 
Myanmar is currently Yamasuhi's ruling ZANU-PF, the NLD has long been in opposition, 
there was no practice of managing the country, not a long time in power, lack of experience 
in market mechanisms and macroeconomic regulation, coupled with Myanmar's domestic 
military forces are still deep-rooted, forming a constraint. The ability of the new Government 
to govern has become an uncertain factor affecting Myanmar's economic and industrial 
development. 
Second, the situation in the country is volatile. Myanmar's civil war has long affected 
economic and social development, and the situation in the country has eased in recent years, 
with a year-long peace in the country in 2015, when the Government of Myanmar and eight 
ethnic local armed groups signed a nationwide ceasefire agreement. In November 2016, 
however, four local forces in Myanmar launched another offensive against government forces 
in the worst fighting since Aung San Suu Kyi came to power. In 2017, unrest among the 
Rohingya in Myanmar's western Rakhine state pushed the Burmese government to the 
forefront of the international community. The internal armed conflict has always been a 
serious challenge for Myanmar, and the volatile situation has cast a shadow over China-
Myanmar geo-cooperation. 
The third, Myanmar's current economic and social development is backward, and the 
basis of China-Myanmar geo-cooperation is poor. Myanmar's per capita GNI in purchasing 
power terms was $4,930 in 2015, well below the world average of $15,529, and only higher 
among Southeast Asian countries than Cambodia and Timor-Leste. Myanmar's 26 per cent of 
the population is currently below the poverty line, with low incomes and low purchasing 
power leading to insufficient domestic demand to drive manufacturing growth. Myanmar's 
inflation rate has been high for a long time, at 9.5 per cent in 2016, compared with 2 per cent 
for ASEAN as a whole (Plecher 2019), and rising inflation has exacerbated poverty, increased 
the cost of business and is not conducive to the development of the real economy. In 
addition, Myanmar's infrastructure is underdeveloped. 
The fourth, education is backward and talents are scarce. The issue of educational 
development and talent development is the focus and difficulty of successive Governments in 
Myanmar. Myanmar's backward educational development and the long-term low quality of 
its national population seriously restrict the potential of Myanmar's national development. 
Myanmar has a tradition of student participation in political movements, and university 
students, an important force in promoting democracy in Myanmar, have been repeatedly 
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crushed by the military regime since the military government came to power in 1988, and 
Myanmar's universities have often been closed. Myanmar's transformation and development 
is severely constrained by the low level of education, overpopulation of agricultural 
populations, lack of economic management and lack of vocational skills. 
 
MYANMAR‘S FOREIGN STRATEGIC APPROACH TOWARD CHINA 
 
From Myanmar's independence to the present, Myanmar's analysis of the flow of 
foreign policy shows that the most striking point is that the basis of the Neutral and Non-
Aligned is the only thing common to foreign policy. Myanmar held that political position 
because of the politician's thoughts of spontaneous healing of the colonial pains and no 
longer recurring the dark history of the past. At the same time, it can be said that there is an 
intention not to be a victim of the international order that has been transformed into a 
bipolar system of US and Soviet power. Since independence, however, the geopolitical values 
of Myanmar have been recognized in the western world, including neighboring countries and 
even in the United States and Europe, confirming the fact that there have been various 
attempts to put Myanmar under its own influence. After the voluntary isolation and closure of 
the Ne Win regime, the new military regime had implemented a biased policy of pro-China 
to maintain the regime. As a result, Myanmar's geopolitical value was temporarily lost. 
However, in 50 years, Myanmar's value has revived as the military regime ends and the 
regime enters into a softening stage, with the unexpected reform and open market policy. 
Recently, however, the diplomatic strategy against China, which defends its policies, is 
changing due to Rohingya issue. Following Rohingya's changes in Myanmar's approach to 
China's foreign policy, the following can be diagnosed. 
When NLD leader Aung San Suu Kyi decided to join the new parliament in 2012, 
Beijing had to coordinate Myanmar's approach to the new government. Beijing could no 
longer place bilateral relations strictly on inter-party relations between the large Union 
Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) and the Chinese Communist Party. China has 
increasingly hosted visits by members of various political parties, and Chinese organizations 
have formed various new bilateral relations with growing civil society in Myanmar. Realizing 
that China is suffering from a serious lack of analytical knowledge about Myanmar and its 
political diversity, Beijing has encouraged various Myanmar‘s universities and policy research 
institutions to develop new research programs for Myanmar. As a result, China's policy 
community has become subtler and more sophisticated with respect to changing relations 
with the new Myanmar, especially as it has been found that the military no longer controls 
the country's economic and political life, as in the SPDC. Gradually began to grasp his 
attitude. Myanmar is linked to China by mountains and sea, and ‗Pauk-Phaw‘ runs deep. In 
recent years, cooperation between Myanmar and China is improving in scale, scope and 
level, with broad prospects for cooperation.  
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According to the data by the Ministry of Commerce of China, the bilateral trade 
volume between Myanmar and China in 2018 reached US $15.24 billion, a year-on-year 
increase of 13.1 percent. China is now Myanmar‘s largest trading country and the largest 
source of investment (The Myanmar Times 2019). Through the friendly and diverse 
cooperation between the two countries, Myanmar explores new strategic diplomatic relations 
with China as a strategy to make up for the criticism of the international community. 
China‘s BRI is a strategic plan of historical and practical importance, offering a new 
platform for regional cooperation and new opportunities for mutual development. Myanmar 
is the largest mainland in ASEAN, a representative of developing countries, and a key partner 
in BRI construction. It is helpful to have a clear understanding of Myanmar's understanding of 
BRI. Myanmar's high-level political leaders have responded positively to the implementation 
of BRI, as China and Myanmar have a bright future to jointly promote BRI. With the 
cooperation issued in November 2014, Myanmar welcomes BRI, but both sides agree to 
inherit the spirit of the Silk Road. Strengthen cooperation in marine economy, connectivity, 
environmental protection and cultural exchange. Promote mutual benefits and joint 
development with countries along the route. However, Myanmar‘s society knows little about 
BRI; awareness is limited to officials and elites doing policy research about China. Even some 
officials of the U Thein Sein government do not know what kind of cooperation can be 
carried out between China and Myanmar. They suggest that China strengthen publicity of BRI 
and said that they can arrange for translation and publication if China can provide proper 
materials (Chenyang and Shaojun 2018). 
The Myanmar government regards the Rohingya as illegal immigrants who entered 
after the country gained independence from Britain in 1948 and after the Bangladesh 
liberation war in 1971, when more people fled to Myanmar to avoid violence. As Washington 
begins to pursue sanctions against Myanmar‘s Army for what American and United Nations 
officials call a campaign of ethnic cleansing against the Rohingya Muslim minority, China is 
taking advantage and filling the gap. Already spending billions of dollars on infrastructure 
projects in Myanmar, China is now also assisting its neighbor in diplomatic efforts to try and 
help burnish the country‘s image in the face of widespread criticism. Though China has 
usually been reluctant to become involved in mediation, it has offered to broker talks 
between Myanmar and Bangladesh, now the host of more than 600,000 Rohingya who fled 
the military campaign of systematic rape, massacre and arson in Myanmar. As China moves 
more aggressively to build a sphere of influence in Southeast Asia, Myanmar is a prime asset, 
a border state with a long coastline that offers a strategic outlet to the Indian Ocean (Perlez 
2017). There is no territorial dispute with China in Myanmar. It seeks to benefit from China's 
infrastructure and energy projects, including Chau Phou Exclusive Economic Zone, oil and 
gas pipelines because Chinese investments do not carry any preconditions about human 
rights or democratic principles. This is even more important for the Myanmar government in 
the context of Rakhine state security and the Rohingya refugee crisis.  
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China has actively supported Naypyidaw's stance on this particular issue. China has 
often prevented the UN from submitting a resolution to Myanmar addressing records of 
human rights abuses in Myanmar. Myanmar will continue to maintain the Pauk-Phaw 
(fraternal) relationship with China (Constantinou; Kerr and Sharp 2016) even as the US-China 
competition heats up. This actually serves Myanmar‘s long-held foreign policy, which calls for 
balancing internal factors while managing external relations independently. Naypyidaw will 
remain a hot spot for competition between China and the United States. On a recent past 
basis, the Myanmar government seeks to enjoy its own interests while maintaining a delicate 
balance in external relations. 
 
OUTLOOK AND IMPLICATIONS 
 
Outlook 
 
Myanmar wants to engage China without giving it outsized leverage. It also hopes the 
fleeing Rohingya do not create a refugee crisis in Indonesia or Malaysia, both predominantly 
Muslim members of the bloc. The following are some of the issues that have been analyzed 
as future prospects. 
First, The China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (referred to as the China-Myanmar 
Economic Corridor) as the Belt and Road initiative (BRI) is the core component of the China-
Indochina Peninsula Economic Corridor and the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Economic 
Corridor in the six Belt and Road corridors. Among them, the China-Indochina Peninsula 
Economic Corridor starts from Nanning, Guangxi, China, and Kunming, Yunnan, and ends 
with Singapore. Myanmar, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Thailand, Malaysia and other countries 
that run through the Indochina Peninsula are onshore silk roads and sea. The connection 
area of the Silk Road is a land bridge connecting the Pacific Ocean and the Indian Ocean. 
Since the launch of the ‗Belt and Road initiative (BRI)‘, China-Myanmar Economic Corridor has 
achieved remarkable results in terms of connectivity, economic and trade cooperation, 
political mutual trust, financial cooperation and cultural exchanges. With the gradual 
deepening of China-Myanmar political mutual trust, China-Myanmar geopolitical cooperation 
under the Belt and Road Initiative has great potential. Aung San Suu Kyi, state adviser directly 
headed the business committee to spearhead the BRI related business in China. In 2018, 
when Aung San Suu Kyi met President Xi Jinping in China, she received a loan of 10 billion 
yuan (about USD 14.36 billion) from China. Therefore, it is highly likely that the Myitsone Dam 
construction project, which has been suspended and is not being promoted, will be re-
promoted in the future. Since 2011, Myanmar has received significant capital from Singapore, 
South Korea and Vietnam. On the other hand, the size of China's investment has decreased 
significantly year by year. China's investment in Greater Myanmar reached $4.3 billion in 
2011-2012, falling to $56 million in 2013-2014 and $51 million in 2014-2015. 
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However, the atmosphere of these investments has recently changed, as shown in 
Table 1. At $400 million in 2016-2017, it has re-emerged as one of the three largest investing 
countries after Singapore and Vietnam, and its investment size has recovered to $1.3 billion in 
2017-2018.Myanmar lawmakers warned of high and rising debt to China and urged the 
National League for Democracy (NLD)-led government to repay the loan as soon as possible 
to avoid a sovereign erosion debt trap. With foreign exchange reserves at a meager US $6.35 
billion in 2018 and the national debt estimated at US $10 billion, of which $4 billion is now 
owed to China. The interest rate on most Chinese loans is a whopping 4.5%, believed to be 
the highest rate among all the foreign government and financial institutions that Myanmar 
now owes. Most of Myanmar‘s foreign debt was accumulated between 1988 and 2011, a 
period when the country was subjected to Western sanctions imposed against the previous 
military regime‘s poor rights record (Lintner 2019). At that time, China was the only major 
foreign donor to lend generously to an exiled government. Myanmar's international isolation 
for over 20 years left it heavily indebted to Chinese monetary institutions. Through the Belt 
and Road Initiative project that China is ambitiously promoting, including a high-speed 
railroad connecting China‘s landlocked southern region to a deep-sea port at Kyaukphyu that 
opens on to the Indian Ocean, that debt load eventually aimed ultimately to facilitate China‘s 
grand strategic designs for Myanmar. 
Second, Myanmar's huge resources and market potential are favorable factors for its 
leapfrog development. Myanmar is rich in natural resources such as rice, wood, and fisheries, 
and rich in natural gas and hydropower resources. Especially, natural gas is the most 
important source of foreign exchange for export in Myanmar. Myanmar has proven natural 
gas reserves of 10 trillion cubic feet, and produced 692 billion cubic feet in 2015. It is exported 
to Thailand and China except for its own use. As an early industrialized country, Myanmar has 
abundant labor resources, and its demographic dividend has provided strong support for its 
industrialization development. Myanmar's population reached 53.4 million in 2018, ranking 
26th in the world and 5th in Southeast Asia. At present, more than half of the labor force in 
Myanmar is engaged in agricultural production, 30% of the rural population has no arable 
land and no source of income, and the potential of labor is huge. A large number of cheap 
labor is the advantage of developing labor-intensive industries.  
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Table 1. Foreign Investment in Myanmar by Country (Source: compiled by author based on DICA data)      
 
COUNTRY 2011-12 2012-13 2013-14 2016-17 2017-18 2018-19 
Australia - - 17.896 19.290 - - 
Austria - - - - - - 
Bangladesh  -           - 1.077 1.500 - 
Brunei - - 2.273 18.026 8.074 10.234 
Canada - 2.102 - 5.150 1.360 - 
China 4345.728 231.773 56.160 481.591 1395.219 634.577 
France - - 5360 790 7.340 490 
Germany - - -        1.153 10.398 - 
Hong Kong - 84.839 104.004 213.700 251.982 456.372 
India 7.300 11.500 26.040 - 10.993 5.000 
Indonesia - - - 9.034 9.859 - 
Japan 4.318 54.063 55.711 60.423 384.119 42.777 
Macau - - - - 3.640  
Malaysia 51.864 4.324 616.108 21390 21.877 1.779 
ROK 25.572 37.942 81.205 66.423 253.904 89.383 
Singapore - 418.233 2300.121 3820..764 2163.963 2409.567 
Sri Lanka - - - - 1.250  
Switzerland - - - - - 16.838 
 
The third, the commerce environment has gradually improved. In recent years, with 
Myanmar's democratization reform, its business environment has become increasingly open. 
Myanmar's Foreign Investment Law was promulgated in 1988. In May 1989, the Myanmar 
Foreign Investment Commission announced economic projects that foreign investors can 
invest in the variety of areas including food, textiles, daily necessities, household goods, 
leather products and imitation products, transportation vehicles and materials, and 
construction materials etc. (Tao 2016). After the new government of Myanmar came to power 
in 2011, it vigorously launched reforms in the economic field, actively introduced foreign 
capital, and strengthened industrial development. In response to the influx of Western 
investment, the Myanmar Parliament passed a new Foreign Investment Law in November 
2012, replacing the 1988 Foreign Investment Law. The new law allows foreign investment in 
power, oil and gas, mining, manufacturing, restaurants and tourism, real estate, 
transportation, telecommunications, construction and other service industries; the Myanmar-
foreign joint ventures have abolished the requirement that foreign investment must account 
for at least 35%. The abolition of the requirement that the proportion of foreign investment 
in Myanmar-foreign joint ventures not exceed 50% in some restricted areas for 8 years of tax 
exemption for foreign investors. The Myanmar government announced a five-year national 
export strategy plan in 2015 to promote exports of rice, beans, aquatic products, rubber, 
wood and forest products, textiles and clothing, and develop tourism.  
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Myanmar is more likely to accept China's participation in the economic corridor, a 
construction project that links China through Rakhine. The corridor has begun building a $7.3 
billion deep-sea port next year at Kyaukpyu, the port city of the Indian Ocean Rakain, by one 
of China's major construction companies. Pipelines from the port are planned to transport 
gas and oil via Rakhine to southern China. Kyaukpyu is of considerable strategic and 
economic value for China as it seeks to speed development of Yunnan and its other inland 
provinces. That value is centered on the development of a deep-water port and the 
construction of accompanying road and rail links to supplement the pipelines already running 
to Kunming. Whether the project also boosts Myanmar‘s economic growth will depend on 
the success of the accompanying SEZ, and the terms under which it takes shape (Poling, 
2018). 
The fourth, China and India will dominate Myanmar‘s foreign policy stage, and their 
dealings with the rest of ASEAN will grow during 2018. Sandwiched between two active Asian 
giants, Nay Pyi Taw will have to balance its relations carefully as India and China vie with each 
other for greater influence. Most importantly, Myanmar must avoid being sucked into conflict 
zones in their common areas of influence and know how to duck whenever these two 
confront one another. In the future, the crisis in Rakhine state will remain a key area where 
Beijing and New Delhi will continue to compete, displaying goodwill to help their troubled 
neighbor. Furthermore, they will try to mitigate any repercussions from the growing 
international condemnation of its handling of the crisis and the myriads of problems caused 
by the massive exodus to Bangladesh, which is now estimated to number 750,000 people. 
The international community will continue to step up pressure on Myanmar to accelerate 
efforts to repatriate more displaced people. But the real problems on the ground still need to 
be overcome. 
The fifth, China will have a special role to play in Myanmar. China‘s new foreign policy 
under President Xi Jinping will increase engagement with Nay Pyi Taw in all areas. Since the 
end of the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, Beijing has been actively 
facilitating peace talks and providing humanitarian assistance. The Rohingya crisis presents an 
excellent opportunity for China to test its diplomacy as never before. Myanmar‘s relationship 
with China involves historical and geographical linkages that cannot simply be wished away. 
Additionally, Myanmar will require Chinese assistance in dealing with important state security 
objectives like ending ethnic insurgency and human and drug trafficking. China also will have 
strong economic investments and linkages in Myanmar that need to be considered from a 
practical point of view. While the present situation in Rakhine state has cast Myanmar, the 
country‘s military and Aung San Suu Kyi in a negative light, it will provide China with a 
window of opportunity to strengthen the bilateral relationship (Ganesan 2018). 
Following the inauguration of the new government in Myanmar, diplomatic relations 
in response to the reform and opening up and recent Rohingya issues have led to the 
establishment of a diplomatic strategy as a way to avoid criticism of the international 
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community, decrease investment, and the resulting isolation of the international community. 
In that regard, Myanmar's future diplomatic relations with China have forced to change. But, 
traditional Myanmar's foreign policy is very likely to maintain its tone, as it is realism, that is, a 
non-aligned neutral path if there are no geopolitical changes, such as the disappearance of 
nearby powers. The current democratic government has abandoned the international 
community's voluntary process of self-reliance in order to maintain its government during the 
military government, and to maintain economic and diplomatic relations with neighboring 
countries at a certain level. It should be noted that on the security side, it will seek to take the 
initiative to structure the order around what can benefit the country. 
 
Implications 
 
Myanmar is located at the crossroads of South and Southeast Asia. It is connected to 
India and China at its northwest and northeastern borders respectively. Additionally, its 
reserves of energy resources, emerging consumer class, youthful population, and its access 
to the Bay of Bengal and Indian Ocean make it an important stakeholder in the Asia-Pacific 
(and Indo-Pacific) region. Myanmar has figured in the foreign policy discussions of most of its 
neighbors, including China, India, and the countries of the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN) (Kundu 2018). Myanmar's internal conflict spurred a new approach with 
China, which was caused by U.S. sanctions and the resulting Myanmar government's search 
for a breakthrough.  
First of all, the Government of Myanmar will have the opportunity to reform its image 
from economic interests and the international community by pursuing diplomatic 
cooperation with China. However, it can have a significant impact on the US-led Asia-Pacific 
strategy. This is because it could have a long-term strategic impact on India, Myanmar's 
neighboring country. By agreeing to build CMEC as part of China's BRI project, China could 
expand the CMEC by including Bangladesh. Myanmar may seek new cooperation as part of 
its BRI initiative with neighboring Bangladesh. In this case, the development situation in India, 
which hinders their role in the surrounding area, can be problematic. As strategic projects 
grow in Qiac, the broader Bengal Bay area will become more interested in Beijing's 
calculations as China's propensity for securing these projects grows and expands. Therefore, 
it is important for the United States to present Myanmar with a balanced leverage against 
china's move, along with its allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific strategy. For example, 
Japan now plays a key role in Myanmar's strategic infrastructure projects. India and Japan 
have agreed to jointly develop connectivity projects in the region, including Myanmar. This 
need for strategic cooperation can have a greater effect when Myanmar's fortunes are 
limited and difficult, as tensions with Myanmar and the West are intensifying. The US-China 
interaction is likely to remain a problem for Myanmar, as it is possible that the international 
community in Myanmar will not be able to resolve its image on racial issues in the near 
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future, and Myanmar is likely to attempt to change its strategic approach in the future, taking 
into account national interests in both the United States and China. As Western countries 
move away from Myanmar due to the Rohingya issue, they will increasingly try to emphasize 
the importance of Naypyidaw's diplomatic balance. The priority decision of the national 
peace process for the economic development of the Aung San Suu Kyi government may be 
argued that it could be a strategic mistake because Myanmar has made it dependent on 
China when dealing with ethnic militant groups on the China-Myanmar border. In fact, this 
strategy minimizes the government's ability to use international goodwill for the necessary 
economic development. Naypyidaw's reliance on China to deal with ethnic issues is drawing 
China into designing China's strategic design as Western countries take an increasingly 
difficult stance on Myanmar's internal conflicts. But to be fair to the Aung San Suu Kyi 
government, the priority of national peace has its advantages in that it provides an 
opportunity to find solutions to the country's ethnic problems. The Government of Myanmar 
underestimated the complexity of the problem, but the aim was to find a solution to the 
problem decades ago in the new era of democratization. 
China's active participation in ethnic conflicts in Myanmar for six years has not been 
successful in minimizing militarized conflicts between Myanmar's military and ethnic 
minorities along the Myanmar border or promoting Myanmar's peace process. In fact, there 
are concerns that a new military conflict may unfold in recent years, with new political or 
military alliances such as the Northern Alliance or the UWSA-led FPNCC, as well as new 
clashes between ethnic militants and Myanmar troops, creating a new level of ethnic conflict. 
Actually Myanmar shares delicate relationships with both China and the United States and 
has been benefitting from this position for decades. Myanmar‘s relations with China have 
primarily been based on asymmetric power equations, which are proving to be beneficial for 
Myanmar (Kundu 2018).Under these circumstances, the United States needs to make efforts 
to improve diplomatic relations with Myanmar from a realistic standpoint in order to 
smoothly pursue the Indo-Pacific strategy and to deal with China's aggressive diplomatic 
strategy toward Myanmar. The US will require strategies quite unlike those that are familiar 
from the past. Above all else, Washington will need patience, subtlety, strategic flexibility, and 
the ability to hold the competing instruments of engagement, hedging, and balancing in a 
reflexive equilibrium that is capable of adapting rapidly, while at the same time rebuilding the 
domestic capacities required to sustain America‘s current preeminence in the Indo-Pacific 
region and actually increase its margins of advantage to the extent possible.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
This paper examines the new foreign strategic relationship between Myanmar and 
China since Rohingya crisis. In particular it has investigated how Myanmar‘s foreign strategy 
toward China was changing as the crucial first stage of negotiations.  
The in-depth analysis of Myanmar‘s foreign policy since the Rohingya issue gives a 
new level of insight into how Myanmar‘s foreign strategy dealt with the international 
response and relations with China. The Rohingya issue have caused the West to re-impose 
limited sanctions and allowed China to reaffirm its financial leverage over the country. When 
the international community recognized the suppression against Rohingya Muslims as ‗ethnic 
cleansing‘ and held the UN Security Council, China was the only country to support the 
Myanmar government who suppressed Rohingya. Since then, the Chinese government has 
publicly supported Myanmar's military operations. 
 Also the results regarding the future prospects show five facts through an analysis. 
Actually from a Chinese perspective for Geo-environment, Myanmar is an important country 
along China‘s ongoing ‗Belt and Road Initiative‘. The China-Myanmar Economic Corridor is 
the core of the six main economic corridors of the BRI. At the same time, Myanmar is also in 
a complex geographically fragmented zone. For many years, Myanmar has been deeply 
affected by multiple forces such as great power struggles and local armed divisions. In the 
context of the ‗Belt and Road Initiative‘, China-Myanmar geo-cooperation has broad 
potential. Taking the common interests of China and Myanmar as the starting point and the 
China-Myanmar economic corridor as the axis, China and Myanmar can focus on priority 
cooperation areas such as infrastructure, industrial development, economic and trade 
cooperation. China-Myanmar cooperation under the Belt and Road Initiative has great 
potential. It is highly likely that the construction projects including Myitsone Dam related to 
the BRI will be re-promoted in the future. In addition, China and Myanmar are putting much 
effort into security cooperation in geopolitical terms. 
Subsequently, we found out that Myanmar‘s future reform and development need 
China‘s support, while China needs Myanmar‘s cooperation for maintaining the stability of 
the Southwest border area. Myanmar is regarded as ‗the last virgin land in Asia‘. The future of 
China–Myanmar cooperation is bright, which will also promote Myanmar‘s development. 
China and Myanmar have solid mutual political trust and strong economic 
complementarities, which determine that China will play a very important and irreplaceable 
role in Myanmar‘s future transition. Myanmar is now emerging as a new country that will 
temporarily become a powerhouse of great powers.  
Taking advantage of this ambience, Myanmar will continue its efforts to build active 
diplomatic cooperation with China, as part of overcoming difficult situations at home and 
abroad. In the future, China will have a special role to play in Myanmar. China‘s new foreign 
policy under President Xi Jinping will increase engagement with Myanmar in all areas. 
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Myanmar‘s relationship with China involves historical and geographical linkages that 
cannot simply be wished away. Myanmar also will require Chinese assistance in dealing with 
important state security objectives. Like saying ‗Misery loves company‘, both Myanmar and 
China are looking for a change in their diplomatic strategy.  
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